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1. Problem Definition 
1.1 Introduction 
The Generalised System of Preferences ("the scheme") helps developing countries, and 
particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), to reduce poverty by offering them import 
preferences in order to generate or boost revenue from international trade. In addition, the 
scheme provides incentives in the form of additional tariff preferences, to countries that 
commit themselves to sustainable development and good government. The scheme currently 
aims to achieve the objectives set out in the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the function 
of the Community’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for the ten-year period from 
2006 to 2015. The scheme grants preferential access to EU markets on a generalised and non-
discriminatory basis to 176 eligible countries and territories. It has three arrangements: 
• the general arrangement (often described simply as "GSP"); 
• the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance (described as "GSP+") which offers additional preferences as 
incentives to support vulnerable developing countries in ratifying and 
implementing 27 international conventions on human and labour rights, 
environment and good governance; 
• the Everything But Arms arrangement (EBA), which provides duty-free, quota-
free access to LDCs. 
The present GSP scheme is implemented through successive regulations, each applying for 
three years. The current GSP regulation will expire on 31 December 2011. On 26 May 2010 
the Commission adopted a proposal to extend the validity of the current regulation until 31 
December 2013, in order to allow time to prepare the revision of the GSP scheme in view of 
the longer legislative procedures introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. A recently completed mid-
term review provides the background for the planned Commission proposal for a revised 
regulation to replace the existing scheme upon expiry in 2013. Both the EBA arrangement 
and the rules of origin provisions fall outside the scope of this revision: the former, because it 
is not subject to periodic reviews; and the latter, because new legislation on rules of origin 
has entered into force in 2011. 
1.2 Consultation and expertise 
This impact assessment has been prepared following extensive consultations with Member 
States and other stakeholders (including civil society, industry, beneficiary countries, the 
European Parliament, and WTO members). The views of stakeholders were taken into 
account, as is highlighted in several instances in the main report. The Commission's 
minimum standards for consultations were met. To assess the extent to which the EU's 
scheme meets the needs of developing countries, a mid-term evaluation was conducted by an 
external consultant, the Centre for Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS). The 
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final report was published on 26 May 2010 on DG Trade's website1. The results of this study 
are reflected in the main impact assessment report where relevant. 
1.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the existing GSP scheme 
The CARIS evaluation of the existing GSP scheme (2010) concluded that: 
• there is clear evidence that the EU's GSP preferences can be effective in 
increasing developing countries' exports and welfare; 
• utilisation rates for the GSP scheme(s) are high, and positively correlated to the 
extent of the tariff and preference margin; 
• the exporting countries capture about half of the rents derived from the preference 
margins; 
• the GSP+ regime has had a positive impact on the ratification of the 27 
international conventions required for eligibility, but progress on effective 
implementation of these is much less clear. 
Nevertheless, the scheme is subject to a number of structural and other constraints (detailed 
both in the CARIS study and in the main report). There are also a number of specific issues 
that need to be addressed in the review process; these are summarised in the problem tree on 
the following page. 
Sub-optimal targeting of beneficiaries 
A large degree of competitive pressure on LDCs is exerted by other GSP beneficiaries. 
Several high-income countries (HICs) continue to be beneficiaries, on the grounds that they 
are not sufficiently diversified. Such countries have the resources to attain higher levels of 
diversification without the help of EU preferences. Much the same is true for so-called Upper 
Middle Income countries (UMIs). And countries that benefit from preferences derived from 
another bilateral preferential arrangement with the EU also continue to benefit from the GSP 
scheme. The use of GSP preferences by HICs, UMIs and countries that already benefit from 
other bilateral preference arrangements increases the competitive pressure on exports from 
poorer, more vulnerable countries, whose needs are far greater and thus deserve increased 
attention. 
Sub-optimal graduation mechanism 
Emerging developing economies have generated very successful export-oriented 
manufacturing sectors that are highly competitive at world level. These sectors receive 
benefits under the scheme, although arguably they no longer require preferences to achieve a 
substantial presence in the EU. They exert competitive pressure on EU industry; and raise the 
barriers to entry for poorer countries which consequently need even greater efforts to 
diversify their export base. The GSP scheme has a mechanism to weed out competitive 
sectors from specific countries and withdraw preferences – the graduation mechanism. Yet 
under the current scheme, it has been barely used. Out of a total of over 2400 country-sectors, 
                                                 
1 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf 
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only 20 have been graduated – 13 of which are Chinese sectors. This indicates that the 
current graduation mechanism is insufficiently responsive to ensure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the scheme. Another important weakness of the graduation mechanism is that 
graduation is based on sections of the EU Customs Tariff which are so large and 
heterogeneous, that products which are not necessarily competitive are excluded just because 
they fall within a category where products from a totally different, highly competitive 
industry predominate.  
Insufficient product coverage 
The GSP scheme has broad product coverage but it is not complete. Currently, 9% of all tariff 
lines are outside the scheme and are subject to positive tariffs. Countries most in need 
sometimes fail to gain access to the EU market because they would want to export some of 
these products. Another de facto limitation on product coverage results from the division of 
product lines into sensitive and non-sensitive ones: non-sensitive products enjoy duty-free 
access, but sensitive products obtain only a tariff reduction of 3.5 percentage points on ad 
valorem duties. 
 EN 5   EN 
 EN 6   EN 
 
Insufficient support to diversification of exports 
The original goal of generalised preferences schemes lent support to diversification by 
industrialisation. Yet the 2010 evaluation found that when all beneficiaries and products are 
taken together, the evidence for diversification is largely limited to products with low 
preference margins exported by emerging economies. The inclusion in the current scheme of 
GSP countries that scarcely qualify as countries most in need (HICs and UMIs) and which 
exert significant pressure on competing EBA and GSP+ products in the scheme – as well as 
the relatively weak graduation mechanism – makes diversification by poorer and vulnerable 
countries more difficult, because the GSP countries capture much of the preferences. 
Inconsistency with overall trade objectives 
The existence of GSP benefits might weaken the incentives for beneficiary countries to 
negotiate bilateral or multilateral trade agreements. By contrast, the objective of focusing 
GSP benefits on countries most in need might have the unintended consequence of providing 
more advanced developing countries with a greater incentive to enter into and conclude 
reciprocal trade negotiations with the EU. 
Low utilization of preferences by some countries 
The competitive pressure exerted by GSP beneficiaries can reduce GSP+ countries and LDCs 
to the status of residual and irregular suppliers to the EU market. Given the low value of 
transactions concluded under such conditions, importers have less incentive to bear the costs 
entailed in claiming preferences (e.g., to obtain or administer origin certificates). As a result, 
many preferences are simply not utilised.  
Insufficient support for sustainability and good governance 
The current vulnerability criteria that determine eligibility for GSP+ are excessively 
restrictive. This limits the extent to which GSP+ can promote sustainable development and 
good governance, in the sense that a less restrictive eligibility requirement can be an incentive 
for a greater number of countries to ratify and implement international rules and standards and 
engage in internal reforms. The condition for access to GSP+ (that the country has not only 
ratified, but also 'effectively implemented' the conventions) is unnecessarily limiting; it does 
not support the incentive based nature of the scheme. The existence of entry windows for 
GSP+ (open only once every 18 months) prevents potential beneficiaries from entering the 
scheme as soon as they have fulfilled all entry requirements. Under the current scheme the 
Commission must monitor the status of ratification and effective implementation of the 27 
specified conventions by examining available information from the relevant monitoring 
bodies. Yet the monitoring mechanism for implementing the conventions presents a number 
of significant weaknesses.  
Inadequate safeguard mechanism 
Several weaknesses have been identified in the current GSP safeguard mechanism, notably 
the lack of definition of key legal concepts; the lack of definition of the rights and obligations 
of parties to an investigation; and the ill-defined procedural framework. 
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2. Analysis of Subsidiarity 
The legal basis for Community action in this matter is Article 207 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU). The principle of subsidiarity does not 
apply in this case. The principle of proportionality is satisfied inasmuch as the regulation is 
the only appropriate type of action that the European Union can take to establish unilateral, 
non-reciprocal, preferential market access for developing countries. 
3. Objectives 
3.1 General objectives  
The scheme has three general objectives: 
1. Contribute to poverty eradication by expanding exports from countries most in need 
(G-1); 
2. Promote sustainable development and good governance (G-2); 
3. Ensure a better safeguard for the EU's financial and economic interests (G-3).  
3.2 Specific and operational objectives  
For the period from 2006 to 2015 the Commission GSP Communication established the 
following objectives for the scheme: 
1. To maintain generous tariff preferences that continue to provide real incentives for 
developing countries to expand their exports in a sustainable manner; 
2. To target the preference on the countries that most need it, in particular by 
terminating preferential access for countries that no longer need it, and by ensuring 
that GSP preferential rates are withdrawn from competitive products; 
3. To offer a simple, predictable and easily accessible preference scheme; 
4. ³To further encourage sustainable development and good governance;  
5. To provide withdrawal mechanisms and safeguard instruments in order to ensure that 
the sustainable development and good governance aspects of the GSP as well as the 
EU's financial and economic interests are protected. 
In order to ensure that policy options considered are the most appropriate for reaching the 
scheme’s general objectives in a changing global economic environment, these objectives 
have been translated into specific and operational objectives:  
The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. To better focus the preferences on the countries most in need (S-1); 
2. To remove disincentives for diversification for countries most in need (S-2); 
3. To enhance consistency with overall trade objectives (bilateral and multilateral, S-3); 
4. To strengthen support for sustainable development and good governance (S-4); 
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5. To improve the efficiency of safeguard mechanisms ensuring that the EU's financial 
and economic interests are protected (S-5); 
6. To enhance legal certainty, stability and predictability of the scheme (S-6). 
The operational objectives are as follows: 
1. To revise the beneficiary country list by deferring benefits to those countries, which 
based on their development, financial and trade needs, no longer need the 
preferences; 
2. To target graduation on the prime beneficiaries ensuring that GSP preferential rates 
are withdrawn from competitive products; 
3. To redefine product sections to reflect more homogeneous product categories; 
4. To simplify GSP+ entry mechanism; 
5. To develop a more effective and transparent mechanism for monitoring and 
evaluating the GSP+ countries' commitment and progress in the implementation of 
GSP+ conventions; 
6. To develop credible and efficient procedures for temporary withdrawal of the 
preferences and procedures for renewal of the preferences; 
7. To improve the administrative procedures of safeguard mechanisms.  
4.Policy options 
The following summary table presents a set of core policy options that have been identified as 
being representative of the main avenues that can be selected. 
Option  Main features 
 
Option A: 
Discon-
tinuation 
Preferences are abandoned for GSP and GSP+ beneficiaries. EBA arrangement would 
remain. 
Option B: No 
policy change 
 
BASE-LINE 
The current policy continues without change. This option has two baseline scenarios: 
B1 (short run) – the continuation of the scheme taking into account the current status of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements. 
 
B2 (long run) – the continuation of the scheme based on the assumption that all on-going 
but unfinished multilateral and bilateral negotiations have been concluded successfully 
Option C: 
Partial 
redesign 
This comprises two sub-options. They have certain common elements, and certain 
differences—C1's changes being less extensive than C2's. 
 
Elements common to the 2 sub-options: 
1. Preferences are deferred for certain eligible countries: 
overseas countries and territories; 
high and upper middle income countries; 
countries with a preferential trade agreement covering substantially all preferences. 
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2. Graduation principles are revised: 
product sections are redefined; 
graduation does not apply to GSP+ countries. 
3. GSP+ entry mechanism is simplified and made more flexible: 
countries must ratify, not fully implement, conventions, while providing binding 
commitments to guarantee their implementation; 
countries can apply for GSP+ at any time. 
4. GSP+ monitoring mechanism is redesigned to enhance implementation of the 
conventions. 
5. More transparent and efficient procedures for temporary withdrawal of preferences are 
introduced. 
6. The administrative procedures of safeguard mechanisms are improved. 
 
Elements that differ between the 2 sub-options: 
1. Graduation threshold 
Option C1 
Graduation threshold remains unchanged. 
Option C2 
Graduation threshold is reduced to 7.5% and 50% safety net is eliminated. 
 
2. GSP+ vulnerability criteria 
Option C1 
The import-share threshold is relaxed (increased from 1% to 2%). 
Option C2 
Vulnerability criteria are eliminated. 
 
3. List of GSP+ conventions 
Option C1 
The list of GSP+ conventions remains unchanged. 
Option C2 
The list of GSP+ conventions is expanded. 
Option D:  
Full redesign 
This option includes and builds upon the features of option C. 
In particular, the product coverage of the scheme is redesigned, with 3 sub-options: 
 
Option D1 
All beneficiary countries receive full product coverage and all products are deemed non-
sensitive No graduation takes place. 
 
Option D2 
A number of industrial and agricultural products move from the sensitive to the non-
sensitive list. 
 
Option D3 
The list of products covered by the scheme is expanded to include a number of industrial 
and agricultural products. 
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5. Analysis of impacts  
5.1 General 
Imports benefiting from preferences account for less than 5% of total EU imports. This 
implies that, while impacts on beneficiaries may be large, the general impacts on the EU are 
likely to be of a limited nature. Impacts have been assessed using the analysis performed by 
CARIS, additional analysis via a SMART model2, and the examination of official EU 
imports, production, consumption and employment statistics. The main variable used to 
analyse social impacts has been employment. Environmental impacts are invariably low, and 
have been analysed separately. 
5.2 Comments on the baselines (B1 and B2) 
There is a natural reduction in the level of import duties (and, therefore, preferences) due to 
preference erosion under the impact of further bilateral and multilateral trade deals. 
Preference erosion reduces imports from GSP beneficiaries; this is the reality against which 
this assessment takes place. In the long run, when all multilateral and bilateral agreements are 
fully implemented, duties are likely to be so low that the idea of preferences becomes largely 
irrelevant – and so would a generalised system of preferences. Other totally different tools 
may have to be designed. Until then, the question is what can be done for the countries most 
in need of preferences. 
5.3.Option A: discontinuation 
Option A ends the GSP scheme while retaining the EBA scheme which benefits LDCs. Total 
EU imports fall, but by an insignificant amount (about €6 billion, or less than 1%). 
General assessment of economic, social and environmental effects 
Relative to B1, the general effects are as follows. The economic and social effects for 
countries most in need are expected to be negative. LDCs would benefit, but the many other 
developing countries and economic sectors which are also most in need would suffer as 
preferential access disappears. Within the EU, three elements will impact upon general 
economic and social effects: producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tariff income. Negative 
impacts for consumers are likely to be compensated by higher tariff revenues, which are of 
the same order of magnitude. The net impact would thus be generated by benefits to 
producers. As explained above, these benefits would on the whole not be significant, but 
would nonetheless have significant positive effects on important sectors (sugar, fruits and 
vegetables, textiles and apparel) – and on the EU Member States where those sectors are 
important. Therefore, these impacts would be positive as a whole. Environmental impacts in 
the EU would be (at best) marginally positive, given that the drop of imports would be 
marginal. As for the countries most in need, it is possible those countries losing GSP+ would 
deviate from environmentally sustainable practices. Thus, on the whole, a marginally negative 
impact may be felt. 
A vs. B1. Effects on: economic social  environmental 
Countries most in need -- -- 0/- 
EU + + 0/+ 
                                                 
2 A model developed by the World Bank in collaboration with various international organisations. 
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Relative to baseline B2, the changes would be expected to go in the same direction, but they 
would be significantly smaller – to the point of not being noticeable. 
5.4 Option C: partial redesign 
Option C has many building blocks. To explore the different angles of these building blocks, 
two sub-options were explored. The main differences between them concern the graduation of 
competitive sectors and the vulnerability criteria under GSP+. With regard to graduation, the 
sectors which will actually be graduated are not known at this stage – they will depend on the 
calculations of imports on the basis of the latest available figures prior entry into force of the 
new regulation. Current figures have been used as a proxy. With regard to vulnerability, C1 
relaxes the 'economic' criterion from 1% to 2%. The actual list of countries which will meet 
the relaxed criterion is not known at this stage – again, these calculations will be made on the 
basis of the latest available figures prior to entry into force of the new regulation. The 
additional countries that would currently meet the test (Pakistan, Philippines and Ukraine) 
have been considered as a proxy. 
C2 eliminates the vulnerability criteria while it adds additional requirements regarding 
conventions. Again, the actual list of countries meeting the relevant conventions criterion will 
be determined as close as possible to the time of entry into force of the new regulation. 
Currently, we would expect these to be the three C1 countries plus Namibia and Nigeria (all 
of them having already ratified the relevant conventions), and these have been used as a proxy 
for the purpose of this exercise. The assessment starts with an analysis of option C1 and then 
describes the main differences that arise under option C2.  
5.4.1 Option C1 
General assessment of economic, social and environmental effects 
When compared with baseline B1, the general effects of option C1 are as follows. Total EU 
imports fall by about €4 billion (a €1 billion increase in imports from countries that have 
never belonged to the scheme, offset by a €5 billion fall in imports from countries that cease 
to be members of the scheme. The economic and social effects on countries most in need are 
expected to be positive, as exports increase and welfare gains accrue.  
As under option A, negative impacts on EU consumers are likely to be compensated by higher 
tariff revenues, which are of the same order of magnitude. The net impact would thus be 
generated by impacts on producers. As explained above, these benefits would on the whole 
not be significant, but would have significant negative effects on important sectors (rice, 
arable crops, oils and fats, sugar, fruit and vegetables, textiles and apparel, and leather) – and 
on the EU Member States where those sectors are important. Therefore, these impacts would 
be negative as a whole. Environmental impacts in the EU would be (at best) marginally 
positive, given that the drop of imports would be marginal. As to the countries most in need, 
the impact of expanded GSP+ membership would lead overall to a marginally positive 
impact. 
C1 vs. B1. Effects on: economic social environmental 
Countries most in need ++ ++ 0/+ 
EU - - 0/+ 
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When comparing the effects of options C1 with baseline B2, the changes would be expected 
to go in the same direction, but they would become significantly smaller – once again, to the 
point of not being noticeable. 
5.4.2 Option C2 
There is one important difference between C2 and C1. Lower graduation thresholds increase 
the level of graduation significantly for certain countries and sectors, particularly for India. 
This leads to a number of effects. The first one is a larger decrease in exports by GSP 
participants as a whole. The second is an increase in EBA exports, as the negative impacts on 
Bangladesh (foreseen under C1) diminish. The result is that, while the positive effects on 
EBA and GSP+ beneficiaries can not be underestimated, GSP exports by many beneficiaries 
will suffer. Dynamic effects are expected to more than compensate for this static loss, so the 
impact as a whole is considered to be positive, but certainly less so than C1. Given that the 
remaining impacts are largely similar to C1, the general assessment table for C2 would 
therefore read as follows: 
C2 vs. B1. Effects on: economic social environmental 
Countries most in need + + 0/+ 
EU - - 0/+ 
 
5.5 Option D: full redesign 
Most of the building blocks of the scheme have been re-defined under option C. However, a 
number of respondents to the consultation suggested a broad expansion of the two other key 
building blocks of the scheme: the range of products covered and the preference margins. We 
have therefore also examined a comprehensive re-design that includes the proposed changes 
under option C, and in addition changes to these two building blocks. In order to simplify the 
analysis, D sub-options are calculated as increments to C2 only. Three sub-options are 
assessed. D1 is a far reaching option. It provides full product coverage expansion and 
elimination of all sensitive products (eg, extending the duty-free, quota-free treatment of EBA 
countries) to all countries most in need (whether GSP or GSP+). This implies that the 
remaining beneficiaries are no longer subject to graduation. D2 and D3 are less far-reaching. 
They take all the parameters of C2 (graduation included) and add partial de-sensitisation (D2) 
and partial expansion in product coverage (D3). 
5.5.1 Option D1: full product coverage, full de-sensitisation 
General assessment of economic, social and environmental effects 
When compared to baseline B1, the general effects of option D1 are as follows. Although the 
economic and social effects on countries most in need are expected to be positive as a whole, 
these gains accrue mainly to sectors which are already competitive, at the expense of those 
which are less advanced. There would be large distributional effects, with the additional share 
of EU imports captured by China, India and other countries that were previously subject to 
graduation having a negative impact on many other countries most in need. EBA beneficiaries 
in particular would suffer (Bangladesh being the prime example), as would GSP+ countries 
such as Pakistan. The overall positive assessment ("+") must therefore be nuanced. The 
positive impact for EU consumers is likely to be compensated by lower tariff revenues, which 
are of the same order of magnitude. The net impact would thus be generated by impacts on 
producers. As explained above, these impacts on the whole would not be significant, but 
would have significant negative effects for important sectors – and for the EU Member States 
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where they are important. As a result, these impacts would be negative overall. Although 
larger than under option C, they would probably be of a similar order of magnitude. 
Environmental impacts in the EU would be marginally negative, given the overall increase in 
imports. The large increase in imports particularly from China or India can lead to negative 
impacts in those countries also. The impact on GSP+ countries would be positive overall 
because, although their exports would increase, the environmental protection framework 
under which (all) businesses operate would be improved by adherence to the relevant 
environmental conventions. The overall balance of these effects would be marginally 
negative. 
D1 vs. B1. Effects on: economic social  environmental 
Countries most in need* + + 0/- 
EU - - 0/- 
*Positive economic and social impacts for countries most in need as a whole hide significant negative impacts 
on EBA and GSP+ beneficiaries. 
When comparing the effects of option D1 to baseline B2, the changes would be expected to 
go in the same direction, only that they would become smaller – but still noticeable. 
5.5.2 Options D2 and D3 
These options build on option C. In order to simplify the analysis, only one of the options, in 
this case C2, has been used as a basis for D2 and D3. There is no reason to believe that 
significant differences would exist if C1 were taken as a basis instead. Given that D2 and D3 
change only one building block at a time with respect to C, only the salient novelties are 
mentioned here. 
D2 and D3 generate preference erosion to the disadvantage of LDCs 
D2 explores de-sensitisation. As expected, the immediate impact is preference erosion for 
EBAs, particularly vis-à-vis GSP competitors, which are the net winners. Given that the 
CARIS evaluation made clear that significant competitive pressure is exerted by GSP 
countries on their EBA counterparts, this was to be expected. India, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Thailand absorb almost all the gains, while EBA countries capture almost none. D3 explores 
product expansion. A similar impact as that described for D2 is foreseen: benefits to GSP 
beneficiaries at the cost of preference erosion and export losses for EBA countries. Both D2 
and D3 thus confirm that product expansion and desensitisation have a price, a price which is 
paid by the poorest and which compounds the preference erosion they suffer. 
D2 and D3 may place obstacles to negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
Compared to option C, these options would arguably send a false signal to our trade partners, 
by creating the expectation that concessions regarding products which have been introduced 
into the GSP scheme or which have been desensitised can be obtained from the EU 
automatically in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The size of the changes introduced by 
D2 and D3 are not sufficiently large as to vary the order of magnitude of the rest of the results 
of option C. However, EU producers of new products that are introduced into the GSP 
scheme, and of those goods which receive higher preference margins via desensitisation, 
would suffer additional pressure. 
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6. Comparing the options 
6.1 Review of different options by objectives and impacts 
The following table compares how well the different options examined above meet the 
objectives sought by a review of the scheme. This comparison is based on three criteria: 
effectiveness (number of objectives met, to what degree); efficiency (use of resources 
necessary to meet the objectives, unintended spill-over effects); and consistency with 
overarching EU objectives. 
Options A C1 C2 D1 D2 D3 
Effectiveness - ++++ +++ -- ++ ++ 
Efficiency -- +++ ++ -- + + 
Consistency ++++ ++ ++ --- + + 
 
A detailed analysis follows, based on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of each of the 
options in achieving the general policy objectives. 
6.2 Effectiveness of the policy options in achieving the general and specific objectives 
Option A 
Option A meets general objective G-1 (contributing to poverty eradication by expanding 
exports of countries most in need) only partly. By focusing preferences on LDCs, it leaves 
many other countries with similar trade, development and financial needs without preferences 
(specific objective S-1) – with adverse economic and social impacts as a consequence. 
Moreover, removing preferences from some countries that are most in need will expose 
export sectors in those countries to competition from developed countries. Option A runs 
directly contrary to specific objective S-4 and general objective G-2 (promoting sustainable 
development and good governance). And it does nothing to ensure better safeguards for the 
EU's financial and economic interests (general objective G-3 and specific objective S-5). By 
contrast, option A can strengthen the EU's hand in bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
(specific objective S-3). It would have positive economic and social impacts for certain 
sectors in certain Member States at a time when so much emphasis is on boosting 
competitiveness, growth and job creation. And last, at a time of extreme pressure on public 
finances, it boosts tariff revenues. 
Option C1 
Option C1 contributes well to general objective G-1 (contributing to poverty eradication by 
expanding exports of countries most in need). In particular, it ensures that preferences are 
properly targeted on countries most in need (S-1) and it reduces the disincentive to 
diversification (S-2) that arises from the competitive pressure exerted by more developed 
beneficiaries of the current system. Option C1's combination of a more flexible entry 
mechanism for GSP+, more flexible trade criteria for eligibility, and no graduation, would 
boost the scheme's contribution to promoting sustainable development and good governance 
(G-2 and S-4). It improves the efficiency of the safeguard instrument (S-5) and the withdrawal 
mechanism, which both would contribute to G-3. It also boosts tariff revenue. It would have 
the unintended effects of strengthening the EU's hand in bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations (but in respect of fewer countries than under option A). There would, however, 
be negative economic and social impacts for certain sectors in certain Member States. 
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Option C2 
The main difference between C2 and C1 is that the lower graduation thresholds of C2 reduce 
total exports by countries most in need. In addition, the more GSP+ beneficiary countries 
enter the scheme, the greater the competitive pressure on LDCs – the neediest of all 
developing countries. These effects make C2 a less effective way to achieve general objective 
G-1 (contribute to poverty eradication). However, it ranks superior to C1 in terms of its likely 
effectiveness for achieving G-2 (promoting sustainable development) because it provides for a 
revision of the required conventions. 
Option D (only D1 is discussed in the executive summary) 
Option D1 targets those most in need by deferring preferences for sufficiently rich 
beneficiaries and for those that enjoy preferential access via a bilateral agreement. Yet it 
eliminates graduation entirely, and extends EBA-equivalent treatment to all beneficiaries 
(which would accelerate preference erosion for the poorest). Overall therefore, it cannot be 
said to be meeting objective G-1. Equally the G-2 objective (promoting sustainable 
development via the incentives of GSP+) is totally undermined by granting EBA- equivalent 
treatment to all beneficiaries. Option D1 improves the efficiency of the safeguard mechanism 
(S-5) and of the withdrawal mechanism (S-6), and thus contributes positively to safeguarding 
the EU's financial and economic interests (general objective G-3). However, D1 is expected to 
decrease tariff revenues at a time of extreme pressure on public finances. Also, it gives rise to 
negative economic and social impacts in certain industrial sectors and Member States. And it 
would significantly weaken the EU's negotiating position in the bilateral and multilateral 
context (specific objective S-3). 
6.3 Preferred option 
The option which meets the objectives of the scheme in the most effective, efficient and 
coherent manner is C, and in particular C1. This does not negate that C2 contain positive 
aspects (review of the list of conventions) which can also be considered. 
7. Monitoring and Evaluation 
The table below includes suggestions for indicators that can be used to assess the progress and 
effectiveness of the preferred option in achieving general policy objectives. 
General Objectives Indicators Sources of 
information 
To contribute to poverty 
eradication by expanding 
exports from countries 
most in need 
- expansion of developing countries exports to EU 
- increased share of imports from countries most in 
need 
- increased utilization of the preferences 
- effective graduation of the competitive sectors 
-increasing diversification 
- Eurostat data 
 
 
To promote sustainable 
development and good 
governance 
 
- increased number of countries committing to 
sustainable development and good governance 
principles within GSP+ arrangement 
- overall improvement of implementation of GSP+ 
conventions by GSP+ beneficiaries 
-number of withdrawals 
 
- reports of relevant 
international 
monitoring bodies 
 
-DG TRADE 
To ensure a better -number of safeguard requests -Safeguard requests 
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safeguard for the EU's 
financial and economic 
interests. 
-number of safeguard measures  
-revenue foregone due to the scheme 
-number of preferential trade agreements signed with 
beneficiaries  
- number of preferential trade agreements signed 
with non-beneficiaries  
 
 
-Eurostat data 
 
-DG TRADE 
 
The effectiveness of the GSP scheme should be subject to formal and independent evaluation 
prior to any subsequent revision. To be effective, such evaluation is likely to require a 
minimum of 3 years' post-implementation data, which implies that the evaluation cannot take 
place before the end of 2017 at the earliest. 
